BY PAUL BARTON
Enquirer Washington Bureau
WASHINGTON -- The January 1997 crash of Cincinnati-to-Detroit Comair Flight 3272 represented a failure of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to set adequate safety standards for icy conditions, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded Thursday.
Wrapping up a 19-month investigation, the NTSB came down hard on the FAA, while saying actions by the flight crew and management of the airline generally contributed to the accident as well.
"Staff believes this accident was a failure of the system," said Bernard Loeb, who heads airline safety issues for NTSB.
As board members accepted the findings, James Hall, chairman of the NTSB, was especially critical of the FAA's inaction.
"Any time we see an accident like this repeating itself, on information we should have already learned, it's an indictment of the whole system," he said. "Icing needs to be aggressively approached, as windshear was in the '80s, so hopefully we can eliminate it as a factor in future accidents."
He called the inaction of the FAA disappointing: "The taxpayers aren't getting what we are paying for."
Flight 3272 took off from Cincinnati on Jan. 9, 1997, and crashed about an hour later on approach to Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport. All 29 aboard -- 26 passengers and three crew -- died.
The crash occurred when a "very thin layer of rough ice" -- likely imperceptible to the pilots -- accumulated on the wings as the plane descended from 7,000 to 4,000 feet in preparation for a final approach, the NTSB staff said.
The rough-edged ice created an uneven airflow interfering with the plane's aerodynamics, resulting in a stall and an extreme bank to the left that the autopilot system was unable to control.
In seconds, the plane was sent diving into a snow-covered field.
In its findings, the NTSB said that "the probable cause of the accident was the FAA's failure to establish adequate certification standards for flights in icing conditions."
The NTSB also cited the federal agency for failing to enforce procedures for operating de-icing systems on U.S.-based airlines generally and for failing to establish minimum airspeeds for icing conditions.
Secondarily, the agency cited the pilots, even though they were operating within known guidelines, for keeping the plane's speed at the "lower margin" of the safety range as it approached the Detroit airport.
The NTSB referred only to the "flight crew" in its probable cause conclusion, not mentioning the names of Capt. Dann Carlsen of Grant County, Ky., or First Officer Kenneth Reece of Fort Wright. The Air Line Pilots Association, while saying it was generally pleased with the NTSB report, took offense at the criticism of the pilots.
Capt. Mitchell Serber, who headed the union's own investigation, said it was conflicting to say that the pilots were operating within known guidelines but should have known to fly faster to avoid icing problems that they were unaware of.
The plane was traveling at 150 knots after getting instructions from Detroit air controllers. NTSB staff said it should have been at least 160 or 170 knots to avoid danger from icing.
Comair itself was faulted for failing to establish "unambiguous" guidelines for flap configurations and airspeed in icing conditions. FAA officials said they are reviewing certification criteria related to icing conditions.
"We think we have started some internal activities already that respond to some of the issues the board has raised," FAA spokesman Les Dorr said.
Comair spokeswoman Meghan Glynn said, "We are going to review the NTSB's findings and will consider any recommendations they suggest."
Much of the NTSB's review was spent on how Embraer issued important new information about EMB-120 and icing conditions in late 1995 and 1996 that was never communicated to pilots.
It included a flight operations bulletin and revisions to the manufacturer air flight manual that covered topics such as the de-icing system and minimum airspeed requirements.
The information was received by the FAA's flight certification branch from Embraer but did not get to the agency's flight standards division, which makes rules governing aircraft operation.
"It's been shown that there's been a lot of paperwork sitting on people's desk," Capt. Serber said.
Mr. Dorr, the FAA spokesman, said, "We have already started to look at how we can improve communications between those two organizations." Mr. Hall, the NTSB chairman, said he wants the FAA to be more "proactive" in dealing with turboprops and commuter airlines, noting that 54 million people flew on commuter planes last year.
The FAA, board members said, has failed to adequately respond to reports NTSB reports on icing that go back to 1981 and include the 1994 Indiana crash.
Since 1981, icing-related incidents involving turboprops have resulted in 40 accidents and 130 deaths, not including the Comair crash, Mr. Hall said.
A lawyer representing some family members involved, Mark Kelley Schwartz of Waterford, Mich., said the NTSB report put too much emphasis on the FAA and not enough on the role of Comair and Embraer. "I think it's blame-shifting," Mr. Schwartz said.
The family of Darinda Ogden, the flight attendant on board, said they were impressed by the NTSB's work but that they will never get over the crash.
"It's painful but we felt we just had to be here," said her father, Jim Ogden.
This includes information from the New York Times.
