A deranged woman with a 14-inch butcher knife stepped closer and closer to Cincinnati Police Officer Dawn Keating. When she was less than 10 feet away, Officer Keating shot four times. Four times she missed. The woman crawled under a bed before giving up. An internal police review exonerated the officer, but sent her to target practice. A city agency legally required to investigate police shootings never got involved.
When police cornered Ralph Schellhammer in a College Hill driveway, the man waved a Civil War sword at the officers and shouted, “You'll have to shoot me.” They did. A police review exonerated the four officers who wounded the man. Again, a mandatory review by the city's watchdog agency never took place.
Anthony L. Jackson looked like asuspect wanted in a burglary, so Sgt. James Whalen stopped his cruiser, patted Mr. Jackson down and found a gun. Mr. Jackson tried to run away. Sgt. Whalen ordered him to stop. When Mr. Jackson turned around, Sgt. Whalen said, he had the gun in his hand, so the officer shot him in the leg. Police exonerated the sergeant. Once again, the city's police watchdog agency never took a look.
Every time a Cincinnati officer shoots at someone, hit or miss, a series of investigations is supposed to begin — within the division and by an external review agency, the city's Office of Municipal Investigations (OMI).
However, a Cincinnati Enquirer investigation of every police shot fired since 1994 found that OMI, created to prevent police from abusing their authority, failed to investigate almost a third of the shootings. As a result, the public must rely on the police to say whether their shootings were justified.
The Enquirer review also found:
• The number of police shootings is low. In the six-year period, Cincinnati officers shot less than half as many people as did police in Columbus, Cleveland or Indianapolis.
Since 1994, Cincinnati police have shot at 32 people. Officers missed 11 and wounded 13. In eight cases, the shots were deadly.
• Officers who violated police policy or procedure in deadly force cases rarely received both discipline and retraining — a crucial combination, experts say.
• In almost a third of the shootings, officers fired at suspects in moving vehicles — a practice experts consider unsafe because it can turn the car into an unguided missile. After the Enquirer raised questions of safety, the division changed its policy. Still, experts say the change doesn't go far enough.
• Cincinnati's deadly force policy is unnecessarily long and confusing, and could endanger officers, experts say. They say it should be streamlined and revised to include guidelines for firing weapons in off-duty or undercover situations.
• Cincinnati allows officers to fire warning shots — a practice experts say has been banned by most departments nationwide. The warning shot label, experts say, can be used to mask intentional shootings that miss the target. Warning shots also contradict the rules governing deadly force, which allow police to shoot only to save a life.
• About 78 percent — or 25 — of the people police shot at were black. About 78 percent of those arrested for violent crimes were black. Of the officers who shot, 75 percent were white — which mirrors the racial makeup of the 1,000-member division.
Lapse in oversight
Though few Cincinnati officers ever fire their guns on the streets, the increase in shootings since 1997 has raised questions about whether police are too quick to reach for their guns.
A lapse in the city's oversight process makes the answers hard to find.
Cincinnati City Manager John Shirey — who supervises both the police and OMI — refused repeated requests to be interviewed about the city's oversight. He referred calls to OMI itself.
Although the agency often does so, OMI was not required during The Enquirer review period to investigate the four warning shots, 38 animal shootings or 19 accidental shots — even if, as in one 1995 case, a civilian is hit. In that case, a Cincinnati officer said he was fending off an attacker when he accidentally shot a man standing behind the suspect. OMI started but never finished its optional review in that case.
The office is required by city ordinance to investigate when a police officer deliberately shoots at someone. Yet, of the 32 times did so, OMI failed to investigate nine cases, in which officers wounded six people and missed three.
Eight of the nine cases happened on the watch of former director James Johnson. In a November interview, Mr. Johnson said he didn't recall the shootings.
Mr. Johnson went on to say that OMI was short-staffed and that an investigator might not have responded to the scene if no one was hit.
After it was pointed out that city law required the agency to respond — hit or miss — Mr. Johnson said he wanted to retract his statement.
“I think we would have responded,” he said. Even if there was no ruling, OMI should have a record of the cases, Mr. Johnson said.
OMI has changed computer systems and methods of searching for cases several times since then, he said. “Not even having a file number, not having a case number, I find that hard to believe.”
His successor, Ernest McAdams, led the search for OMI records of the cases after the Enquirer sent him a list. Mr. McAdams said before he took over in 1997, the office wasn't notified by police of some cases or it was notified and made no ruling. When City Council hired Mr. McAdams, it increased the number of OMI investigators from three to five and reduced the agency's duties.
However, the ninth shooting that slipped through without review happened in October 1998, after Mr. McAdams took over. Off-duty Officer Robert “Blane” Jorg fired five shots at an intruder in his home. The intruder escaped.
Mr. McAdams said OMI has no record of being notified about the shooting. But Linda Backscheider, who oversees the notification process in the police communications office, said her records show an investigator was called.
Since learning of the Enquirer's findings, Mr. McAdams said he has ordered police to notify his department of every shot fired — warning, accidental or intentional.
“I'd like to know about all of them and then we'll decide after that if we want to investigate,” Mr. McAdams said.
"Most powerful authority'
Shootings by police “should always be a hot issue,” says Cincinnati Police Chief Thomas H. Streicher Jr., who took over the division in March — just two weeks before officers fatally shot Michael Carpenter during a traffic stop.
“Deadly force is the most powerful form of authority that anyone has in the nation,” the chief said. “Only police officers have it. Not the Army, not the Navy. But it's also a tough issue because it means second-guessing the split-second decision made by officers who risk their lives every shift.”
Just over 4 percent, or 44 officers, have shot at a civilian since 1994.
Most of the civilians were armed. Of the 32 cases in which officers shot, 15 of the suspects had guns, 5 had some type of knife, one had a brick, one a rock and a board. A car was considered the deadly weapon in nine cases and the other suspect was unarmed.
During the same period, Cincinnati police officers were assaulted nearly 1,200 times.
Ugly evidence of the danger police face on the street rocked the city in December 1997. Spc. Ronald Jeter and Officer Daniel Pope were shot to death while serving a warrant. Less than three months later, Officer Kathleen Conway Hood was seriously wounded when a man forced his way into her police cruiser and shot her three times.
“Deadly force is in response to something. We're not in the driver's seat, so to speak, as to the reason those things happen,” said Cincinnati Safety Director Kent Ryan. “Those are small numbers. They are not large. They are particularly not large when you consider the number of police-citizen encounters.”
Community leaders say they understand that police must protect themselves, and they point out that only three of the eight fatal shootings since 1994 have prompted outcry.
“I believe officers deserve perfect respect and when they tell a person to stop, really, they should stop,” said civil rights activist the Rev. Fred Shuttlesworth. “But the policeman's job is to apprehend and to bring to court and then the judge says whether or not the person committed the crime. Until we get to that point, we will never have ideal police-community relations.”
Uneven discipline
Since 1994, when officers made mistakes in deadly force cases, the division often identified the errors but only sporadically issued discipline or ordered further training. When discipline was handed down, the Enquirer found, it was unevenly applied.
For example, former Chief Michael Snowden issued a written reprimand — and no training — to an officer who shot and wounded a man, even though an investigation showed the shooting was unjustified because the officer was out of danger when he fired. The penalty was the same as that given to officers who fired accidentally and hit no one.
Retraining coupled with discipline is the only way to ensure an effective policy, experts say.
“If you don't hold the officers accountable and you don't somehow discipline the officer, then you create a custom and practice of allowing that kind of behavior,” said Geoffrey Alpert, a University of South Carolina criminal justice professor, considered a leading authority on deadly force. “So the next one who does it says, "Well, wait a minute, you know I did the same thing Officer X did' and you run into an enormous problem.”
Officers in six of the 32 cases involving shooting at civilians received discipline or retraining — only two of them received both. The two most recent shootings remain under investigation. The investigation has been completed in a third case, in which discipline is expected.
Former Chief Snowden was in command during most of the period studied by the Enquirer.
Since Chief Streicher took command, he has ordered retraining and discipline for two officers involved in controversial 1999 shootings.
The officer in the only other unjustified shooting case during the period studied, Police Spc. Cecilia Charron, was suspended for five days and ordered to retrain after she shot at, but missed, a man as he slept in his parked van in Winton Terrace in February.
“Sometimes, I think about it and I thank God that I survived,” said Mr. Alfonzo, who is now suing the city.
Chief Streicher also coupled discipline and training for Officer Brent McCurley, who fatally shot Mr. Carpenter during a March 19 traffic stop in Northside. While police said the shooting was justified, Officer McCurley received a written reprimand and 40 hours of remedial training for tactical errors and procedural violations he made leading up to the shooting.
For years, discipline in the division has been unevenly applied and poorly enforced, said Cincinnati police Detective Cecil Thomas — a 27-year veteran and president of the black officers' group, the Sentinels Police Association.
“If you're going to pick and choose who to hold to the policy, then you have a policy that's worthless,” Mr. Thomas said, adding that some black officers feel they are held to stricter disciplinary standards than their white counterparts.
Chief Streicher said cases must be reviewed individually. Mitigating factors — such as the officer's past performance and his perceptions at the time of the violation — should be considered. However, he said, the division is revising its policy with an eye toward standardized punishment.
Former Chief Snowden said he supports standardized discipline. In his experience, he said that it was tough to make punishments stick because Civil Service mediators or independent arbitrators often overruled penalties.
Only four times since 1995 have arbitrators let the division-issued discipline stand, records show.
The arbitrators are “sitting there thinking, "God. What would I have done if this guy came at me with a stick or something like that' and they are more lenient towards the officers,” the former chief said.
Expert review
For a closer look at Cincinnati's deadly force cases, the Enquirer sent the city's policies and police summaries of the shootings to four nationally known experts.
First, the experts noted that Cincinnati has had few shootings overall. They also praised division investigators for catching officers' tactical mistakes, such as approaching a suspect in an unsafe manner or shooting when a partner was in the line of fire.
Experts acknowledged that deadly force cases are difficult to judge because the critical factor is the officer's perception of deadly threat and because police officers so often meet violent resistance.
“In almost any of these situations, had the citizen stopped and put their hands up, shots would not have been fired,” said Lawrence Travis, a professor of criminal justice at the University of Cincinnati.
Second, the experts expressed grave concern about the division's moving-vehicles policy, which allowed officers to shoot if the car was being used as a weapon.
The division changed that policy afterthe Enquirer began its review. Officers now can shoot at a moving vehicle only if an occupant is using something other than the car as a deadly weapon.
The change doesn't go far enough, says Carl B. Klockars, professor of criminal justice at the University of Delaware.
“I don't think that there's one case (where police shot at a moving vehicle) that they could point to where the officer was saved or a life was saved,” Mr. Klockars said. “You can't kill a car.”
Chief Streicher said there must be room for exceptions.
“There are some people out there who will tell you, "If you try to run a policeman over with a car, the policeman ought to kill you.' In some circumstances, maybe that's true,” he said.
Third, the experts noted that Cincinnati's policy on deadly force is unclear and outdated.
“It was surprising to me to see a policy of a major city that is so sloppily written,” said William A. Geller, a researcher and author who works with the U.S. Department of Justice and has studied hundreds of deadly force policies. “Confused cops are usually not the best city employees.”
An example of the confusion is a lengthy section that describes when officers may or may not shoot fleeing felons, misdemeanor suspects and juveniles, he said.
Since 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed police to use deadly force only if the officer perceives immediate life-threatening danger to himself or others.
“I don't care if it's a shoplifter or Charles Manson. What matters is whether the person is endangering life or limb,” Mr. Geller said.
Cincinnati Police Lt. Col. Richard Janke said the felony section serves an important purpose.
“Felonies that involve serious physical harm become connected to decisions about using deadly force,” Lt. Col. Janke said.
For example, if a suspect fired a shot during a bank robbery and then ran down the street with a gun in hand, he could pose a greater threat to life than an armed robber who had not fired a shot inside the bank.
However, Mr. Geller said the policy should clearly and simply state that officers may shoot only when a suspect poses an immediate threat to officers or other civilians.
Fourth, the experts raised concern about the use of deadly force by off-duty and plainclothes officers.
The division trains off-duty and plainclothes officers to call for on-duty, uniformed officers to make routine arrests and traffic stops, but it is not addressed in the deadly force policy. Writing such guidelines into the policy gives them added weight.
Mr. Travis pointed to 11 cases in which officers who were off duty or in plain clothes approached suspects rather than waiting for uniformed back-up.
“It was actually kind of surprising that there weren't undercover officers shot by other officers,” Mr. Travis said. “That's a dangerous situation because you have officers showing up on the scene and you have bad guys and good guys all running around with guns in plain clothes. It's hard to tell who the other officers are.”
Several of the suspects in these cases later told police that they had refused to cooperate because they thought they were dealing with robbers, not police.
Proper procedures for undercover and off-duty situations are covered at the police academy, former Chief Snowden said, but there is no formal training for officers before they start undercover assignments.
“There's an assumption sometimes that the individual knows what they're doing,” he said. “But it needs to be (addressed) as soon as somebody's put into old clothes even for a day.”
Finally, the experts noted concern over the practice of warning shots. The division's deadly force policy allows officers to fire if “convinced a warning shot will possibly save a life or alleviate the need to take a life.” Cincinnati officers have fired four warning shots since 1994.
“Many police departments have a flat prohibition against firing warning shots. They're dangerous,” Mr. Klockars said. “They're in contradiction of the fundamental rule that you don't fire a weapon unless you are in immediate danger of being killed or having somebody else killed.”
In the Tristate, several departments ban warning shots, including the Butler and Clermont county sheriff's offices and the Boone County Police. The Hamilton County Sheriff allows them.
"You don't ever get over it'
Shooting a civilian changes an officer's life.
Chief Streicher remembers vividly how he criticized himself after he shot and killed a drug suspect in 1980.
“Nobody comes into this job to kill people. You come into this job because you have a belief in a lawful society,” Chief Streicher said. “It's not just shoot and walk away. There's a tremendous amount of investigation that goes on, a tremendous amount of public criticism, a tremendous amount of self-criticism.”
The shooting, the self-doubt and the rigors of the investigations, left a lasting impression.
“You don't ever get over it,” Chief Streicher said. “Mine's almost 20 years old. I think about it all the time.”
Deadly force, weak controls
Shots fired: The cases
A mistaken shot in the dark
Toughest decision takes a split-second
No one knows national figures on police shootings
About this series
Agencies with review power
Experts who reviewed shootings
